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The Role of the Independent Accountant 
in Effective Risk Management* 
ABSTRACT 
The wpthis  k is pDresent a pqective  cm the ways in wbich an 
independent accountant can contribute to the management of risk in a business 
organization. Business conditions and challenges have heightened the interest in 
risk  management  by  many  stakeholders.  Independent  accountants  have  an 
important role to play in providing assurance related to the quality of risk man- 
agement processes which extends beyond their traditional role as the auditor of 
financial statements. As organizatioiis become more and more affected by exter- 
na1 and internal risks, and increasingly dependent on integrated information sys- 
tems  and the expansion  of nonfinancial  information  for monitoring  risk,  the 
value of extemal assurance services should increase. However, while presenting 
an opportunity to the profession, the focus on risk management also comes with 
a few challenges, including obtaining market permission to provide risk-based 
assurance services, acquiring the necessary skills and expertise, avoiding regu- 
latory intervention and maintaining independence as the scope of services pro- 
vided  by  independent  accountants  increases.  Overcoming  these  challenges 
should position the accountancy profession to wel1 serve its clients in a broad 
array of risk-related services. 
*  These remarks are based on a speech given by the author at the Catholic University of 
Leuven (October 2001). 1 am grateful to Marleen Willekens for the opportunity to for- 
mally organize these thoughts int~  a structured presentation. "T/7e chnnce of  guit1 is by  eve~y  7nar1 more or less overvalzied, 
arzd the clzai~ce  of loss is by 7110st  1ne11  undeier-valzred. " 
Adainnl  S~niti~,  ITGalt17  of  1'Vatloiis, l 776 
I. NTRODUCTION 
Every decision talteil by ai1 individual os orgailization entails weigh- 
ing relative risks and potential gains. Good thiilgs may be hoped for 
when a course of action is selected hut there is always a risk that 
~rilexpected  bad  things may  also occur. Rislt conles in many forms 
2nd  often  has  an  unforeseeable  inipact  on  an  organization. 
Furthei~~lore,  risk is often subject to wishful thinking and hindsight 
-  before soinething bad happens few people are able to foresee the 
event; afterwards it is easy for many to say "I ltnew it al1 along". Few 
people expect to get hit by a car while crossing the street, to get food 
poisoning fion~  eating in a restaurant, os to lose their money wheil an 
apparently  successfi~l  company  suddenly goes  banlu-upt.  However, 
once such an  event  occurs,  there  are  always individuals  who  wil1 
observe  "he  should have  seen that  car  racing  down the  street",  os 
"she  should have noticed the filthy floor in the restauraiit",  or "of 
course, the conlpany's results were too good to be tiue". 
People generally do not think  in terms of "risk"  when iiiaking a 
decisioii. Instead, they thinli of achieving their objectives: "getting to 
the other side of the street",  "having a pleasant ineal", or "saving for 
retirement".  Such a perspective  often leaves  individuals under-pre- 
pared to cope when things go wrong. It is easier to look back when it 
is too late to prevent what has already happened then to look forward 
and anticipate something that might occur in the future. The combi- 
nation of diverse iilfonnation aboilt rislt, the low predictability of the 
impact of risk in a given situatioii, and over-reaction to past eveilts, 
iiicreases tlie clialleiiges of effectively i~ianaging  risk in maily deci- 
sion-inaliing  situations. Nevestheless, the success os failure of iildi- 
vidual decisions and organizational strategies is dependent 011  proac- 
tive anticipatioii aild preparation  for circumstances that coine under 
the iiiantle of rislt. 
The ecoilon~ic  literature on agency relationships, infomation asym- 
metry and inarket valuation of uncertainty has greatly expanded our 
uilderstanding of how risk affects the outcoines of our decisioils, and 
operations  research has helped us  to  develop  inodels  that explicitly iiicoiyorate risk as part of decision-malting. At the saine time, a large 
body  of  psychological  research  on  judgment  and  heuristics  has 
addressed the probleins that individuals often have in  analyzing aiid 
inteiyretiiig  risk  related  to  specific  decisioiis. As  decision  makers 
becoine  more sensitive to risk, decision processes are modified aiid 
individuals look for ways to reduce os elinlinate the impact of risk on 
their decisions. Iii geiieral, the need to effectively identik monitor and 
respond to risk necessitates a proactive approach to risk manageinent. 
Since organizatioiis (and individuals) often have numerous options for 
handling risk, the better their decisions, the more likely tliat the ilega- 
tive consequeiices of specific rislts can be avoided. The puspose of this 
papeï  is  to  discuss  how  management  of  a  business  organizatioii 
responds to risk iii its environment and, specifically, the role indepen- 
dent accountants can play in assisting iii the risk management process. 
IT.  RISK AND CONTROL 
Forma1  processes  of  decision-making  are  often  well-uiiderstood, 
althougli not always explicitly followed  in practice. In the  siinplest 
fom,  a decision process consists of five identifiable components: (1) 
decisioii context, (2) alternatives, (3) criteria, (4) infoi-ination and (5) 
action. First, there is an objective that the decision-inaker desires to 
achieve. This caii be considered the decision context. These are usu- 
ally  alternative  strategies  for  achieving the  objective  that  inust  be 
cvaluatcd, olie of which will be selected f3r action. To  facilitate the 
decision, criteria for assessing the appropriateness of alternatives are 
specified, and then infovrnation is obtained and iiiterpreted about how 
the various alternatives fit the criteria. Finally an action is taken, i.e., 
a decision is inade. If al1 goes well, the decision inaker will achieve 
the desired objective as a result of the action taken. 
Risk can be defined as the likelihood  that the outcomes from the 
decision  process  will  be  less  than  desired,  that  is,  the  objective 
implicit in the decision context is not fi~lly  met. In  soine situations, 
the  shortfall relative to the  objective niay be  sinall and acceptable, 
while in other sikiations failure to achieve a desired objective inay be 
catastrophic. Negative  outcomes can arise froin a breakdown in  any 
of the coinponents of decision iiiaking -  objectives inay be iiiappro- 
priate',  alternatives  niay be  overloolted,  criteria may be  mis-speci- 
fied, information may be overlooked os inisiiitespreted, or individ~ials may siinply choose poorly. Furtliermore, since al1 decisioiis affect the 
future, there  is always a random element to the outcome. Random 
outconies reflective  of  "bad  luck"  inay  also  result  in  a  failure to 
achieve the desired objective -  this is also a part of risk2. 
A conscientious  decision-niaker  will  consider  the potential  risks 
associated with  a decision and inay undertake steps to initigate  the 
perceived risks as best as possible. In general, the decision-inaker lias 
four ways to respond to aiiy risk: (1) accept, (2) avoid, (3) transfer, or 
(4) control. First, the rislt may simply be accepted as inlierent to the 
decision, implying the decision-iiialter will take no further action in 
regards to the risk. Second, the risk might be avoided by  choosing 
alteinatives that make the risk irrelevant. Thirdly, the risk niight be 
tvansferred to another party through insurance, rislt-sharing arrange- 
ments or out-sourcing. Finally, the risk might be contvolled through 
specific actions to directly reduce the likelihood or potential  impact 
of the risk. Such a proactive  approach is comon  for the risks that 
are considered to be the most serious in a given decision context. 
Risk in a business organization is manifested in the myriad deci- 
sions that underlie  the  actions of its  stakeholders, including  share- 
holders,  management,  creditors,  employees,  custoiners,  etc.  Many 
risks are shared -  presumably al1 stakeholders are interested in the 
success of the organization. Threats to an orgailizatioil's success such 
as coinpetition, negative  economic events, increased resource  costs 
and loss of customer confidence are rislts to most, if not all, stake- 
holders. However, each group of stalteholders also has their own con- 
cerns about risk: shaïe-eholders are conccrrrccl about thc behavior  of 
management and related corporate governance, creditors wish to pro- 
tect the  standing of their claims, employees fear job  insecurity  and 
being misused by incompetent inanageinent, and management wislies 
to avoid loss of operational control and to miniinize the perception 
that  they  are  at  fault  for  random  outcomes. Al1  stakeholders  will 
adopt  responses  to  perceived  risks  iii  an  attempt to  niinimize  the 
potential negative impact of these rislts, and specific activities will be 
undertaken that, collectively, comprise the rislt management process. 
111.  RISK MANAGEMENT 
Risk management is the continuing activity of minimizing the impact 
external forces may have on the outcome of a set of decisions, that is, to reduce the likelihood or iinpact of circumstarices that could cause 
outcomes  to  be  less  thaii  the  desired.  It  is  essentially  aiï  iterative 
process  with  no  clear beginiïing  and  certainly no  ending. The  risk 
management process presumes that the organizatioii os individual has 
specified its objectives and adopted a strategy and  set of actions to 
achieve  those  objectives. Risk management  consists  of  five  clearly 
identified components (see Fig~~re  1). The initia1 step in risk manage- 
ment is to identzb and describe the sources of risk and the poteiitial 
implicatioiis of the risk for the organization. These risks cali be priori- 
tized based on their potential  to negatively impact the  organization. 
Once a set  of risks has  been  identified, then appropriate l.esponses 
IIILISI be  detennined  kom one  or more  of the  four  ûptiûns:  avoid, 
accept,  transfer,  os  control.  Furthesmore,  a  system  is  needed  that 
would allow stakeholders to nzeasz~re  risk on a tiinely basis; othenvise, 
there would be no way to be forewasned about risk. The measurement 
system would provide periodic data about risk that would allow stake- 
holders  to  monitor  the  current  situation. Finally,  if the  infosmation 
about risk suggests that it is not being held to an acceptable level, a 
fùrther reaction os intervention by stakeholders may be needed. 
FIGURE  1 
The Risk Management P~-ocess'~ Risk  management  is  a coinplex process  that  is  often  iinprecise 
and difficult to uiiderstand. However, we can make a few observa- 
tions about the relatioiiship betweeii risk and efforts to control risk 
that we wil1 refer to as the three Principles of Risk Control'.  First, 
as we have already argued, every decision involves risk, i.e., risk is 
an inherent corilponent of the decision process. Removal os reduc- 
tioii of risk in a specific context requires an action by olie os more 
stakeholders. If  a  specific risk  cail  affect  a  specific  decision,  its 
iinpact on the organization wil1 be deterrniiied by the way in which 
the organization responds to the risk. Tliis observation caii be suc- 
ciiictly stated as: 
First Principle of Risk  Control: Risk, once piflesent, will rewzairz 
present zlnless a stakeholder takes actiorz to control the risk. 
The ability of an organization to mitigate a specific risk will depend 
on the nature of the response adopted. The decision to accept a risk 
iinplies tolerailce of tlie risk at its cur-sent level. However, a decision 
to  avoid, transfer  os control a risk will require  specific action. The 
stronger tlie response taken, the less of ai1 impact tlie risk will have 
on the related decision context. Avoidance may be the inost effective 
response if properly irnplemented, b~it  in inost sihiations total avoid- 
ance  is  usually  difficult  os  too extreme  a response. A decision  to 
transfer or control a risk wil1 generally require action by the decision 
inalter but not al1 effoi-ts to transfer os control a risk will be equally 
effective. This observation leads to oir second principle: 
Second Principle of Risk  Conti*ol: The reduetion of risk is prdo- 
portional  to the  'Ifor*cen  of a stakelzolder S  rvsponse to risk. 
In this context, "force"  could refer to a number of attributes of con- 
trol.  One  such  attribute  is  the  diagnosticigi  of  contïol procedures 
being used. For example, personiiel that are closest to a decision con- 
text are in the best position to observe tlie negative conditions asso- 
ciated with a specific risk, and coi-sespondingly, are usually the most 
able to respoiid effectively to the conditions. Also, the more accurate, 
timely and precise the infonnation about a risk, the inore successfi~l 
stakeholders will be at intervening to reduce the risk. Another possi- 
ble attribute of "force"  is objectivity. This refers to potential bias in 
control procedures. For exarnple, the individual closest to a decision 
context may have the inost incentive to hide os ignore underlying risk 
conditions. Os, personnel inay ignore risk conditions due to pressure to "loolc tlie other way" froni senior iiiaiiagement. In slioi-t, the more 
diagnostic aiid objective tlie control response, tlie greater tlie "force" 
applied to  a rislt, aiid  tlie  larger  the red~iction  in risk  tliat will be 
acliieved4. 
The third observation about risk control is that aiiy effoi-t to coiitrol 
risk changes the environment sui-sounding tlie decisioii process. Such 
a change will iiievitably change the risk calculus applicable to a deci- 
si011 context. More specifically, the effoi-ts made to reduce one mani- 
festation of rislt will create new risks os iiicrease the potential impact 
of other risks. Iii short, for every action taken there will be a reaction 
within the system. For exaniple, the decision to tighten credit stan- 
dards  to  reduce  losses  from  credit  customcrs  will  cimultaneously 
increase  the  risk  that  sales targets  are  missed  because  sonie  cus- 
tomers will  now  be turned  away that would have pre\7iously been 
accepted. Similarly, the decision to introduce an Internet-based sales 
channel to red~ice  the loss of marltet share to electronic retailers cre- 
ates an entirely  new  set of rislts related to  on-line traiisactioii pro- 
cessing that did not previously exist. These examples lead us to our 
third principle: 
Third Principle of Risk Control: Efforts taken to reduce risk wil1 
also have the opposite effect of expanding risk. 
How inight these principles relate to the audit of financial statements 
and the  role  of  independent  accountants  in  the  risk  n~anagement 
process? First, hiring independent accouiitants is one way that man- 
ageineiit  can responu" to risk -  independent accountants can have 
no effect on rislt unless engaged by one os iiiore stakeholders. Per 
the first principle, certain rislts related to the accuracy of financial 
statements are unlikely to be reduced unless subject to examination 
by an exterilal auditor. Second, the "force"  independent accountants 
would exert on risk is generally high. Auditors' extensive experieiice 
aiid broad knowledge base increases tlieir ability to diagnose prob- 
leins even though they are not a direct participant iii the processes of 
the organization. As outsiders, auditors usually have a high degree 
of objectivity, even though there  continue to be  controversial inde- 
pendeiice issues that exist under tlie current regulatory stnicture the 
professioii.  Tliirdly,  independent  accountants  are  often  well-posi- 
tioned to obseive the action/reaction of risk control that inevitably 
follows  from  the  actions  taken  as  part  of  the  risk  inanagenient 
process. A.  Tlze Role of Independent Accozrr7tants as Asszlrance Provide~*s 
If we accept that independent accouiitants liave a valuable role to play 
in the  overall  management  of risk within  an  organization, tlie  next 
question that arises is what that role should be. 111 the traditional view 
of extemal auditors, that role is relatively iiarrow5.  Figure 2 highlights 
the  cui-rent and potential  roles  of  auditors  in  the  risk  management 
process.  Traditionally, the  externai  auditor  touches  on  most  of  the 
coinponents of risk management, but with an extremely nai~ow  focus. 
Auditors identifj risks, but only those directly related to the potential 
for misstatement of financial results. They eval~iate  how management 
responds to risk and the quality of the measureinent systein, but oiily 
for that smal1 set of risks related to financial reporting. Finally, only 
financial results are subject to auditor verification. If iio problenis are 
detected,  os  erroneous  items  that  are  discovered  are  corrected,  the 
auditor can provide assurance over the quality of the financial reports. 
FIGURE 2 
Ruk  management and the Independent Accoz~ntant A broader view of the accountant's role can be developed by rec- 
ognizing that the accouiiting system and resulting reports are just one 
form of measurement systein used to manage risks in most organiza- 
tions. The skills and knowledge needed to conduct an audit of finan- 
cial statements might easily be adapted to a broader range of topics 
that could be the focus of extesnal assurance services. Focusing first 
on what auditors have historically attended to most directly, indepen- 
dent accountants are expert  at evaluating inforination  systems and 
determining the accuracy of infonnation so assurance services could 
be expanded to other elements of the organization's  iiiformation sys- 
tems. Systeins and infonnation related to  internal  decision-making 
and risk management could be the subject of externa!  assurance just 
as easily as financial infonnation. An even broader possibility is that 
accountants could provide assurance that the systeins and measure- 
inents were appropriate for the risks being monitored. 
Independent accountants might also assist in the identification of risks 
and help to plan responses to risk, os provide asswance related to nian- 
agement's  efforts in these  areas. How  do stakeholders luiow  that the 
organization's assessments are reasonable and appropriate? Has the orga- 
nization missed some important risks or mis-weighted the risks that are 
identified? Are management's responses to various risks appropriate and 
effective?  Given the  accouiitant's  broad  business  experience,  industry 
knowledge and independent viewpoint, an extemal auditor could provide 
assurance that management has addressed al1 potentialiy significant risks 
and prioritized tliein appropriately. Once the independent accountant has 
developed the luiowledge base to allow a broader exaniination of risk 
and risk management, that luiowledge could be used to evaluate whether 
management's responses to risk are adequate, reasonable aiid cost effec- 
tive.  Finally,  the  timeliness  and  appropriateness  of  manageinent's 
response to changing risk conditions could also be exainined. 
The perspective that extemal auditors are part of a broader risk inan- 
agemeiit process raises the potential for expanding the set of assurance 
seivices that are of value to clients. In fact, c~u-rent  developinents iii audit 
practice support this view as evidenced by ongoing research by several 
inteinational accounting fii~ns,  including Andersen's The Bzisiness Audit, 
KPMG's  BMP  and  Ernst  & Young's  Atidit  Innovation projects.  The 
iilethods and procedures that comprise these audit approaches are con- 
sistent witli the perspective on risk management presented in this paper. 
Tlie new  inethods  (and  services)  are  not  without  challenge  however. 
Issues of professional regulation, independence, market pesmission, and linkage with the  core financial statement audit inust al1  be  exainiiled 
before an expansion of assurance seivices can be fully explored. These 
challenges are addressed later in the paper but first we wil1 discuss al1 
integrated approach for evaluating client risk that could provide a foun- 
dation for a broad range of risk-related assurance services. 
IV.  RISK EVALUATIOPd 
Ai1 independent accountant may be uniquely positioned to develop an 
integrated and coinpreheiisive analysis of an organization's risk pro- 
file and to perforni ai1 overall assessineilt of risk managemeilt. Few 
organizations  or  professions,  other  thail  accounting,  combine  the 
sanie high level of knowledge of both internal operations and exter- 
ilal inarkets that is needed for effective risk analysis. On one hand, 
the independent accountant can develop an in-depth understanding of 
an organization's  strategy,  business  plan,  market  position,  external 
threats  and  overall  situation based  oil  industry  expertise,  training, 
proprietary  databases  and  technology  support. At  the  saine  tinie, 
accountants' experience with information systeins, internal processes 
and verificatioil of perfonnailce results allows thein to exainine the 
internal activities of the organization i11  detail. 
FIGURE 3 
Assessrnent and Evalziat~oi~  of Risk iiz  a BZISZ~~~SS  Organizati~n'~ 
Strategie Analysis 
\  Risk Evaluatioii  / 
Process Analysis 
1  Assurunce about Risk 
Conditions Figure 3 provides an overview of the risk assessment aiid evalua- 
tion process that would be appropriate for an independent accountant. 
Tlie accountant's risk evaluation starts with a broad view of the orga- 
nization's environnient wliich we will refer to as stlpategic analuvsis. 
The purpose of strategic aiialysis is to identi@ and prioritize the risks 
to  the  organization  emanating  froiii  the  external  eiivironment6. To 
facilitate this analysis, the accountant first aslis questions about the 
organization's objectives, strategies and business plans. It is critica1 
that  the  organization  be  able  to  articulate,  and  the  accountant  to 
uilderstand, liow the organization plans to meet its objectives. Failure 
to develop this uiiderstanding maltes  it very  difficult to understand 
the risks  that  niay tlu-eaten those  objectives7. Next, tlie  accountant 
should identify and understand the components of tlie organization's 
extenial environment that could be the primary sources of risk. These 
components  would  iiiclude  customers  and  markets,  resource 
providers,  coinpetitors,  strategic  allies,  governnient  agencies  and 
other  external  forces  (e.g.,  economic  niarkets,  analysts,  even  the 
weather). Eacli component is a potential source of risk and would be 
analyzed in detail in order to identifj and describe as many potential 
risks as possible. The accountant will develop a broad set of exteinal 
risks for fui-ther analysis, regardless of the liliely level of their signif- 
icance. Risks that turn out to be insignificant can be omitted later in 
the process. 
Once the  set  of  external risks  lias been  identified, the  potential 
impact on the organization of each risk would be evaluated. Figure 4 
illustrates  how  an  accountaíit  could  document  the  evaiuation  of 
strategic risks in the forni of a Risk Map. Each risk is evaluated along 
two diinensions: likelihood of a negative impact and potential inag- 
nitude of impact. Tlie higher that a risk rates on one or both dimen- 
sions, tlie  more  serious the  risk  is  to  tlie  organization. The  initia1 
placement of each risk is based on its intrinsic properties before con- 
sidering manageinent's  response  or potential warning  signals  froin 
perfoniiance ineasures. Risks that are rated as potentially significant 
(e.g., risk 5)  are subject to further evaluation by looking at manage- 
inent's response to the risk and performance ineasures that are rele- 
vant for monitoring tlie risk. If the responses to a risk are strong and 
effective, it can be downgraded as evidenced by the arrows and stars 
in Figure 4. If perforniance measures reveal warning signs tliat a risk 
may be beconiing serious, it niight be upgraded. In our simple exani- 
ple, Risk 5 is initially the most potentially severe risk but has been downgraded due to effective management  controls. Risk 4 becomes 
the most significant because it has beeii upgraded based on waining 
sigiis that wotild be apparent iii perfoimance data. Furtherniore, Risk 
l would receive little attention because it was not initially considered 
significant and had  little potential to  affect the  organization  in tlie 
near fiih1re9. 
FIGURE 4 






Low  Moderate  High 
Likelihood of Potential Risk 
Once the accountant has a thorough understanding of the external 
environment, he can then examiile the intemal operations of the orga- 
nization, whicli we will refer to as process analysis. We progress from 
an extemal to intemal view for three reasons. First, the inteinal oper- 
ations of the organization are defined based oii tlie iiecessary interac- 
tions  with  tlie  extemal environment  as influenced by  the  organiza- 
tion's  strategy. For example, the decision to be  a high quality, high 
niargin  retailer  necessitates  dealiiig with  comparable  suppliers  and 
maltes reputation  for  qiiality and  service more  iinpoi-tant than  low 
costs. Second, the design of specific processes will be greatly influ- 
enced by tlie extemal environment. For example, the handling of sales 
orders at an intemet retailer may be quite different than a traditional 
bricks-and-mortar retailer. Finally, external rislts are often manifested as specific intei-nal risks. For exainple, exteinal econoniic conditions 
that limit the  quality of the labor pool available may be inanifested 
iiitemally through the hiring of poorer quality personnel that require 
inore training and are prone to less effective performance. 
Effective process analysis is complex but caii be broken down int0 
a number  of discrete  steps. Tlie key  steps for process analysis are: 
l. Identify internal processes critical to achieving the objectives of 
the organization. 
2.  Identifj the objectives of the process. 
3. Describe the activities that coinprise the process. 
4.  Determine the information flows related to the process. 
5. Identify rislts eiiiaiiating froiii the process. 
6. Assess controls related to the intemal risks. 
7. Analyze performance nieasures related to internal risks. 
8. Prioritize intei-nal rislts in a Risk Map. 
The first  4  steps  are  informational  and facilitate  the  subsequent 
identification and evaluation of risks. An internal process is deemed 
to be critica1 if it is crucial to the success of the company, is subject 
to substantial risk and/or has extensive links with the external envi- 
ronment (Step 1). Process objectives should derive froin the relevant 
overall organizational  objectives  (Step  2). Fusthermore,  the  objec- 
tives should drive the design and execution of activities within the 
process (Step 3). Detemiining information flows is an impoi-tant step 
because it wil1 relieal what infomation management uses to control 
the process and may also provide specific performance measures that 
can be used to assist in the evaluatioii of risks (Step 4). 
Step 5 is pasticularly important and is facilitated by  reference to 
the external risks that have already been  identified. The accountant 
should coiisider how each of the extemal rislts might  affect critica1 
processes.  For  example, fluctuations  in  foreigti cui-sency  exchange 
rates niay have an impact on revenues and cause tlie organization to 
implement  hedging  activities to minimize the impact of such rislts. 
There may also be rislts associated with tlie process that do iiot obvi- 
ously relate to specific extemal threats, e.g., problems with inforina- 
tion processing. The final evaluation of process risks includes assess- 
ment  of  the  effectiveness  of  internal  controls  and  management's 
responses  (Step  6),  evaluation  of  relevant  performance  measures 
(Step 7), and documentation in a Risk Map (Step 8). After completing the strategic and process analysis components of 
Figure 3, final conclusions can be reached about r"esidzla1 r-isks, that 
is, those risks that represent a significant near-te1111  threat to the orga- 
nization. A resid~lal  risk is one that has been deemed significant but 
for which there is not an adequate os effective inanagement response, 
or recent performance  measures have iildicated that a problein  inay 
exist.  At  this  point,  the  accouiltant  has  generated  a treine~idously 
large volume of infomation about the organization and its risk stnlc- 
hlre. The accountant's understanding of the  organization  should be 
broad aild deep and provides a basis for offering assurance related to 
numerous aspects of risk management, iiicluding the audit of finan- 
cial statements. 
V.  ANALYZTNG  RESIDUAL RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR EX- 
TERNAL ASSURANCE 
Virtually al1 of the services identified in the last column of Figure 2 
link  to  the  knowledge base  obtained  through  tlie  accountant's risk 
evaluation. Whether  offering  assurance  about  the  completeness of 
management's own risk analysis, the qualiîy of responses to identi- 
fied rislts, os the appropriateness of the organization's  perfonnailce 
measurement  systems,  the  accountant  draws  on  the  knowledge 
obtaiiled through the risk analysis. However, it is als0 important to 
note that the risk analysis can contribute directly to the conduct of the 
traditional audit even if no other assurances are sought by the organi- 
zation. 
To illustrate, consider five possible inlplications for the traditional 
audit that caii be derived from specific residual rislts: 
Auditor Expectations 
Analytica1 evidence related to rislts, processes  and accounts is con- 
sidered as part of the traditional audit. However, a coinrnon problein 
that  is  often encountered is that  the  auditor lacks a foundation  for 
generating  reasonable  expectations  about  the  performance  resiilts. 
Auditors often resort to coinparing performance measures  over time 
(e.g., to last year) without adequate consideration of changing condi- 
tions. Knowledge of risks in general, and residual risks  specifically, 
provides an extensive and independent lmowledge base on which to coiiditioii expectatioiis of performance, and could greatly iinprove tlie 
diagnosticity of analytica1 procedures. 
Auditors are required to examine tlie internal control environment of 
an  audit client in order to  assess  control risk for  specific  fiiiancial 
statement assertions. This exanîination  oftcn focuses  on transaction 
processing  and only briefly  touches  on the motivations  and incen- 
tives of executives. Many recent cases (e.g., Enron) have highlighted 
that qiiestionable accounting decisions often einanate from question- 
able management motivations. Individuals  usually  do  "bad"  things 
when  they  are under  stress. A tliorough  understanding  of the  risk 
structure of the client helps the auditor to understand the pressures on 
liianageinent that may cause them to adopt questionable accounting 
practices. 
Many accounts are subject to a high degree of estimation aiid uilcer- 
tainty.  Traditional  audit  methods  rely  oii  tests  of  transactioiis  and 
comparisons with historical results to determine if account valuatioiis 
are reasonable. However, these evaluations can be greatly facilitated 
by  a thorough understanding of residual risks. For example, sigiiifi- 
cantly increased pressures  froin competitors niay  signa1 that inven- 
toiy valuations are too high even though the coiiditions have not yet 
been reflected in historical turnover ineasures. The knowledge gath- 
ered about this type of risk aiialysis wil1 have a direct effect oii the 
auditor's assessinent of inherent risk for specific financial stateinent 
assertions, in this case the valuation of inventoryLO. 
Auditors  are required  to assess the risk that  a client is not a going 
concern, i.e., that it may suffer extreme fiscal distress iii the ilext 12 
inoiiths  whicli  would  raise  questions  about  the  realizability  of 
account valuations. Typically, auditors make this assessinent based 
on  reported  financial results  (e.g., losses,  low  cash  flow, iiegative 
equity) and  compliance with  financial  obligations.  The analysis  of 
risk as described in this  paper  would  add  a great  deal  of relevant 
information to the assessment of going concern problems. Client Needs 
Soiile residual risks may simply indicate that a client needs to change 
its operations to  address risk more effectively. Since auditors  com- 
~iionly  prepare  a management letter at the end of each engagement 
with  recoinniendations  for  improving the  organization,  the  assess- 
ment of residual risk provides an excellent source of information for 
preparing &u!y  valuable fccdback to thc clicnt. 
The  above  discussion  highlights  just  one  way  in  which  the 
knowledge obtained from risk analysis could be useful to an inde- 
pendent  accountant, and consequently, to  the client. Further uti- 
lization of the risk analysis may depend on the purposes of various 
stakeholders  and  the  nature  of  questions  being  raised.  Internal 
auditors could use the insights from risk analysis to assist them in 
the allocation of their resources  during the conduct of their own 
testiiig  and evaluations. Manageinent  can  use  the information to 
help  them  prioritize  the  allocation  of  resources  to  advaiice  the 
objectives of the entire organization. External stakeholders would 
also benefit because of the iniproved efficiency and effectiveness 
of the  organization. However,  reporting to  external stakeholders 
o11  the information gleaned froin risk analysis would be problem- 
atic  at  this  time  because  such  information  would  probably  be 
considered  confidential  and  is  not  required  by  any  disclosure 
regime1'. 
VI. PRINCIPLES  OF RISK CONTROL AND CHALLENGES T0 
THE PROFESSION 
The broad view of the role of independent accountants in risk man- 
agement  espoused  in  this  paper  may  be  intuitively  appealing  but 
these  are  a nulliber of  difficult  and potentially  controversial  issues 
that inay need to be  addressed before  independent  accountants can 
pursue the opportiiiiities for expanding assurance services. This paper 
does  not  attempt  to  provide  a  coinprehensive  view  of  these  chal- 
lenges but focuses on four issues that highlight the difficulty of trans- 
lating risk concepts int0 professional p~actice'~. 
Market permission: An independent  accountant wil1 be  able to 
offer specific professional services only if the market is willing to pay a reasonable fee tor those services, that is, there is a dis- 
cemible demand for the seivice. 
Expertise: New sewices often require new  skills aild expertise. 
Absent  those  skills,  expanding  assurance seivices  is  difficult. 
Furthennore, the  farther accountants  extend assurance  services 
beyond the core audit, the more likely they are to i-un up against 
stiff  competition  froin  other  professional  seivices  firms  (e.g., 
consultants). 
Regzrlato y Structure: Given that independent accountants have a 
monopoly  over the audit  of financial statements that has been 
granted  by  regulators  of  financial  markets,  the  expansion  of 
audit sen~ices  int0 other areas of risk management inay trigger 
intervention by regulators conceined about possible loss of qual- 
ity in the core audit. 
Independente: Assurance  services obtain much of their  value 
from the objectivity of the provider.  Offering multiple assur- 
aiice  services to the  saine client may raise questions of inde- 
pendence  and  undermine  the  credibility  of  the  accountants' 
opinion. 
While these obstacles have been extensively  discussed by practi- 
tioners,  academies and regulators  in various fonims, we wil1 add a 
new view of these issues by considering how the Principles of Risk 
Control might compound or alleviate some of these concerns. Figure 
5  summarizes  the  potential  links  between  the  Principles  of  Risk 
Control  and the challenges  of expanding risk-based  assurance  ser- 
vices. The first principle highlights that risk caiinot be reduced unless 
stakeholders take action to do so. As previously noted, independent 
accountants can be a source of risk reduction for ai1 organization, but 
only if the finn is hired to provide  assurance services. There are a 
number  of reasons why independent accountants may not be a pri- 
inary source of risk reduction beyond the core audit. For exainple, the 
services offered by the accounting firm may not  generate adequate 
dernand because they are not perceived by the inarket as having ade- 
quate value. Also, inadequate  expertise,  regulatory restrictions  and 
perceived  independence  conflicts  could  cause  the  market  to  turn 
away  from  independent  accountants  offering  some  assurance  ser- 
vices. 1  Poteiitial  First Priiiciple: Risk, OIJCL'  /  SCCOII~  Priiiciple:  Tlie  Third Priiiciple: E8ljoi.t~  1 
1  Cliallenge  presen,,  ii.ill rem~iiil  piaseili  /  redzrciion oj risk is dii.ecr1~  tokei? io irdice riik ii.iI1  1 
1  1  iinless n sin1celioldt.i~  tirkes  proporiionol  *o rhe  "force  "  olso liiii'e [he opposiir  1 
ianageinent wil1 exisi only 
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The second principle einphasizes that tlie ainount of risk reduction 
achieved from a specific action depeiids on the strength of tliat action 
relative  to  the  residual  rislts  being  addressed.  The  extent  of  risk 
reduction achieved tlu-ough external assurance  seivices wil1 depend 
on the expertise of the professionals providing the service, the nature 
of regulatory guidance on perforrning the service, and the objectivity 
of the service providers. Obviously, the more expertise the accoun- 
tant lias, the higher the quality of the service provided, and the inore 
impact these is on risk inanageinent. Regulatory guidance would gen- erally be aimed at iniproving the quality of assurance services but, in 
soine cases, guidance may become a minima1 benchmark ratlier than 
an iinpetus for improving quality. Finally, if the independent accoun- 
tant is potentially biased because of a financial os other relationship 
with the client, tbe quality (strength) of assurance services will poten- 
tially deteriorate. 
The final principle of risk control suggests tliat an action to control 
risk wil1 change the organizational environment such that the action 
can also expand risk in unforeseen ways, that is, an action to control 
risk will have side effects within the organization. The link between 
action and reaction will probably be better understood by more expe- 
rienced and expest service providers who will be able visualize the 
side  effects  of  specific actions  and  plan  for  such  indirect  effects. 
Regulators, als0 being aware of potential negative side effects froin 
soiiie services, iiiay restrict  independent  accountants  froiii offering 
assurance services that are feit to be incompatible. For example, the 
wel1 known and continuing debate about the appropriateness of out- 
sourcing intesnal audit activities to a conipany's financial auditor rec- 
ognizes that the intemal audit services may undesmine the quality of 
the core audit, i.e., efforts to reduce some risks through the outsourc- 
ing of internal audit may als0 increase other risks related to financial 
reporting.  Finally, tlie provision  of multiple  assurance services also 
lias implications for the independence of the provider since the judg- 
inent required in one service may be underniined by the conditions of 
another  service, making the two  services  potentially  incompatible. 
Until these challeilges have been effectheb addressed, the potential 
impact of external assurance services on risk management reinains an 
open question. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
As independent accountants wrestle witli the challenges of a chang- 
ing market and keeping their services relevant  to tlleir client base, 
risk manageineiit and the accountant's  role in facilitating tlie control 
of risk is gaining  more  and more attention. Accountants  niay have 
significant oppostunities in the risk management process beyond tlie 
basic  a~idit  of  finaiicial  statements  and their  extensive  knowledge 
inay provide beneficia1 synergies for delivering risk management ser- 
vices. However, the proper role of independent accountants as part of a risk management strategy is far from settled. Maiiy commentators 
believe  that  any  services beyoiid the basic  audit  of financial  state- 
ments are inappropriate, while others have argued that large interna- 
tional fini~s  might consider giving up audits eiitirely in order to get 
away from the restrictions that inhibit their other services. Less con- 
troversial, bilt still subject to some debate, is tlie need for auditors to 
expand their consideration of risk beyond basic financial repoi-ting, 
regardless of wliether extended assurance seivices are provided to a 
client. Regardless of one's view of the range of services of a profes- 
sional firin, the  use  of  risk  analysis  and  an understanding  of risk 
management is important if independent accountants are going to ful- 
fill a usefill role as assurance providers,  even if that assurance con- 
tinues to be focused on fiiiancial reports for the foreseeable fi~ture. 
NOTEN 
The old adage "to be careful wliat you wisli for" suggests people do not always Imow 
tvliat they want. 
An interesting  question  inay arise in instances of failed outcomes as to whether the 
failure is due to randomness or a failure by decision makers to adequately anticipate 
and prepare for risky conditions pertinent to a decision. In otlier words, bad decision- 
malting inay  often masquerade  as "bad  lucli".  The  concept  of bozmded ~ationalir)~ 
acknowledges that hurnan decision makers can not consider al1 pertinent information, 
options and criteria that may be applicable to a specific decision conduct. The limi- 
iations inherent in bounded rationality niay be a major source of "bad  luck. 
Wit11  appropriate apologie:  to  Sir Isaac Newton  for borrowing his  thee Laws  of 
Motion (Newtoilian Mechanics). 
We  do  not  meai1 to  imply  that  diagnosicity  and  objectivity  are tlie  only  relevaiit 
attributes of control effectiveness. They are presented herc as exaiilples of the type of 
attributes that niay influence the "force" of a control. 
We  recognize that several international accounting iïrn~s  have undertaken extensive 
development of new audit i~ietliods  and value-added services since tlie niid-1990's. 
The commeilts  in tliis paper  about "traditional"  auditing refer to the balance  slieet, 
accounting cycle and substaiitive approaches to the extemal audit. 
The level  at  which  to apply  strategie analysis  may  vary  across  orgaiiizations. For 
large, complex orga~iizations,  a business  level sub-unit rnay be a more appropriate 
unit of analysis than the overall orgaiiizatioii. 
To illustrate,  consider the case of Enron. A general  conclusion  reached by  analysts 
and regulators  is that virt~ially  no outsider, includiiig tlie auditor, had a clear under- 
standing of Eriron's business plaiis, creating a situation where iiiappropriate practices 
could go unchecked for an estended period, ultin~ately  ending in a catastrophic busi- 
ness failure (see "The Enroii Disaster", Fovtz~ne,  December 24, 2001). 
Depending on the purpose of the risk evaluation, the accountant rnay need to perform 
tests of tlie iiianagement responses to deterrnine if they are truly effective. In an audit 
engagement, these would be considered tests of controls. 
Time frame sho~ild  be  coilsidered when  evaluatiiig risks. In the  long term,  almost 
eveiy risk  could  be  significant  so some reasonable time  horizon  (e.g., one year) 
should be adopted in order to facilitate the prioritization  of the identified risks. 10.  The audit risk model represents the risk that an auditor wil1 reacli ai1 incorrect con- 
clusion about the presence of inaterial inisstaternents  in  the financial report  as the 
coiiibined  effect of (1) tlie  likelihood  tliat  a misstatement occurs in tlie  acco~intiiig 
system (inherent risk), (2) the likeliliood that the internal control systeni fails to pre- 
vent or detect the misstatement (control risk), and (3) tlie likelihood that tlie auditor's 
tests fail to uncover tlie inisstatement (detection risk). Evidence abo~it  the organiza- 
tion's  control environi~ient  wil1 have a direct  effect on the auditor's  assessineat of 
control risk. 
l l. A notable exceptiori is the requirenient that tlie critica1 risks  of ai1 organizatioii  be 
disclosed in a proxy statement at the tinie OS  a p~ibiic  offering. However, tlie external 
auditor does nat provide specific assurance about tliose disclosures. 
12.  The recent sound defeat in the USA of tlie AICPA's  "Cogenitor"  initiative to estab- 
lis11  an  international  certification program highlights ilie problems  of translatilig  a 
concept~ially  logica1 view of the accounting professioii into a specific prograni or set 
of services that would be valued by the profession  and its clients. 
13.  Adapted from Aliditing: Assurnnce & Risk, 2"d Edition by Knechel (Soutli Westein 
College Publishing (2000). See Figure 2-5 on page 35. 
14.  Adapted  froin Auditing:  Assurni~ce  & Risk,  2nd Edition  by  Knechel  (2000).  See 
Figure 5-3 on page 125. 